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Law Undone: Corporeal Subversion in Mariella Mehr’s 
Stoneage 
_Abstract 
At a time in which the corporeality of excluded subjects is prominent in socio-political 
discourse, this article proposes a critical interdisciplinary reading of the way in which 
the juridical positioning of the corporeal is designed to obscure the threatening rup-
tures in the originary body of the law. The sedentarizing anti-nomadic program of 
removing children and incarcerating them as wards of the state in Switzerland between 
1926 and1972 demonstrates a systematic juridical authorization of the attempt to dis-
rupt and excise the ‘diseased’ and ‘degenerate’ body of the Yenish from the ‘ordered’ 
body of the pure state. Through a close analysis of Mariella Mehr’s novel Stoneage 
(1990 [1981]), read through a theoretical framework informed by Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari’s work on the “Body without Organs,” Giorgio Agamben’s reading of 
Primo Levi’s “Muselmann,” and vulnerability theory, this article aims to lay bare the 
ways in which law is implicated in the process of negating corporeal disorder in the 
context of a eugenic program conducted against the ‘unlawful’ body. 
1_Introduction 
From 1926 to 1972, an anti-nomadic program was put in place in Switzerland in which 
Yenish children were ruthlessly hunted down by the Ouevre d’entraide aux enfants de 
la grand-route (Association for Assistance to Traveller Children).1 In total, around six 
hundred Yenish children were forcibly removed from their parents and put in foster 
homes, orphanages, prisons, or asylums as wards of the state. This program of forced 
sedentarization was implemented by private organizations such as the renowned Pro 
Juventute foundation in order “to protect children in danger of abandonment and va-
grancy” as part of a program entitled Hilfswerk für Kinder der Landstrasse (Relief 
Work for Children of the Road).2 The classification of vagrancy as a crime under the 
legal code of the Swiss federation made it possible for parents to become legally di-
vested of their guardianship rights. The legal authorization of forced separation was 
established under the Swiss civil code (Zivilgesetzbuch) of 1912, permitting the long-
term employment of this strategy of removal despite the existence of international ob-
ligations such as the UN Genocide Convention of 1948, which defines the forceful 
transfer of children as genocide.3 The positioning of travellers as degenerative and dan-
gerous vagrants reflects a historical juridical narrative used to justify the sedentarizing 
strategy of punitive measures exacted through anti-nomad laws across Europe, includ-
ing the Egyptians Act of 1530 in England, for example, which allowed the punishment 
of vagrancy with expulsion, deportation, and even death.4 Vagrancy was denounced as 
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an “infestation,” increasing hostility amongst the sedentary population against nomadic 
communities regularly ostracized as “vagrants disturbing the social order.”5 These “va-
grants” were constructed as vehemently anti-state, rejecting the social obligations of a 
post-feudal society in which each subject must play a role in a sedentary hierarchy.6 
Along with the treatment of the Roma diaspora, acknowledged as “profoundly, danger-
ously unsettling to settled society,” the denigration of the Yenish as an ethnicity defined 
by nomadic practices reflects a quixotic practice of representation, framed through the 
criminalization of nomadic minorities across Europe.7 The juridical narrative framing 
nomadic minorities as a dangerous threat correlates with the creation of the Swiss Fed-
eral State in 1848 (although the removal and forced settlement of Yenish minorities 
had been evident in the independent cantons of the state long before). From the nascent 
birth of the modern nation-state, cemented in the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, any 
nomadic presence is narrativized as an anarchic attack on the “order and stability” of a 
territory, bound and authorized through the law.8 
The forging of a nation through a mythic sense of territorial continuity inseparable 
from territorial settlement (following the development of a feudal system of linear 
property and entitlement interests) establishes a sense of history in which, “in the 
depths of nationalist-phantasmagoric time, [there] is an autochthonous beginning of 
each nation, a mythical origin which links the two legitimating charters of national 
integrity: genealogy and territory.9 Any interpretation that challenges this connection 
between people and territory is fundamentally disruptive to the narrative of the nation, 
demonstrating both its fallibility and the juridical fiction of the national spatial imagi-
nary.10 Historically, nomadic minority groups represent a threat to the assumed stability 
of a sedentary spatial order that is fundamental to the authorization of the nation-state, 
as a singular ontology of the relationship between people, territory, and identity medi-
ated through property and mandated through the law.11 The exclusion of traditional 
nomadic peoples from territorial entitlement was therefore authorized on the basis of 
the minimal status accorded to those without a “fixed abode.”12 In this context, proper 
occupation of territory was defined only through the sedentary cultivation of land, em-
ploying the same arguments used to justify colonialist endeavors and negate the rights 
of Indigenous nomadic groups in which the principle of terra nullius provided legiti-
mate grounds for conquest.13 Viewed from this perspective, with the emphasis on sed-
entarization as a form of enclosure, nomadic people became not only legally invisible 
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but were rendered fundamentally destabilizing to the nation-state. Indeed, shortly after 
the creation of a Federal Constitution in 1848, the institution of laws pertaining to Ver-
gantenfahndung (search and arrest of ‘vagabonds’) demonstrated the use of anti-no-
madic discourse to shore up the borders of the modern republic. 
This lawful program of corporeal assimilation is portrayed in Mariella Mehr’s work 
of auto-fiction, Stoneage, recounting her personal experiences of institutionalization in 
Switzerland as part of the Swiss authorities’ drive to eradicate the Yenish community.14 
Mehr was forcibly removed from her mother shortly after her birth in 1947, and was 
subsequently institutionalized in foster homes, psychiatric hospitals, and prison. This 
nonlinear work of auto-fiction attempts to map the trajectories of multiple personalities 
born out of her experiences of institutionalization from the age of five. Mehr recounts 
her experiences through disjunctive and multiple narrative voices, reflecting the frag-
mentation she suffers in response to the trauma of separation and the violence inflicted 
upon her as a ward of the state. The text displays a nomadic structure, with its nonlinear 
structure, and some pages bearing no more than a few sentences, a single sentence, or 
paragraphs without indents. The style is further characterized by uneven, spasmodic 
punctuation and disjointed syntax compounded by a nonlinear narrative that veers from 
a confessional retelling to a mythological subplot, written in a stream-of-consciousness 
style approach.  
In the novel, Mehr acknowledges that her ethnic and cultural identity marked her 
out as a dangerous body from birth: “to the guardians of the sedentary order and their 
superiors the gypsy way of life was not fun but rather asocial and dangerous to society” 
(S, 4). Writing about disembodiment under the law in this way reasserts embodied pres-
ence, where writing can be read as an “act of resistance, challenging the linguistic struc-
tures of the dominant discourse, structures that are analogous to those responsible for 
perpetrating, justifying and subsequently concealing this oppression.”15 Mehr’s use of 
a stream-of-consciousness technique, lack of punctuation, gaps in the text, and seman-
tic distortions create a shifting site in which the juridical techniques of dismantling the 
nomadic body are examined; Mehr’s text can be read as a literary excavation of the 
unraveling of the law through corporeal means. In this instance, the literary text pro-
vides a hermeneutic framework with which to reimagine concepts of law differently, 
particularly the way in which the violence of the law dissects the ‘illegitimate body,’ 
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and to what extent the law is undone through this process of exercising normative cor-
poreality under the juridical gaze. Through a close reading of this text, it is possible to 
interrogate the notion of the limit or threshold in relation to corporeal spatiality, in order 
to examine what might be defined as “the very domain of the incommensurate.”16  
Drawing on a theoretical framework informed by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guat-
tari’s conception of a Body without Organs (BwO), this article aims to consider how 
the spatial borders of the corporeal state are imagined in the context of supposed no-
madic ‘degeneracy,’ and to consider in turn how this deconstruction posits a challenge 
to the foundations of the law. In effect, I aim to attempt to respond to the question 
which asks how “the ‘body of the law’ [is] itself dependent on the ‘lawfulness of bod-
ies’?”17 Attending to the corporeal threat posed to the law by a minority excluded from 
the national spatial imaginary provides a timely opportunity to critique the ways in 
which “the legal system sucks the material out of the materiality of the environment, 
converts matter into semantics, reduces bodies into subjects.”18 This is highlighted 
through socio-political discourse in the positioning of vulnerable bodies as policed yet 
abandoned sites at the border,19 racialized, offending and illegalized bodies imposing 
on the ‘protected’ spaces of the nation-state,20 or, in Giorgio Agamben’s words, the 
“bare life” existing outside the law.21 At a time when these narratives prove oppres-
sively resilient in the ways in which they shape the discourse around bodies that are 
Othered by and through the state, I argue that it is necessary to offer a critical interdis-
ciplinary reading which “returns to the inner folds of the law" in order to lay bare its 
strategies of spatial corporeality.22  
2_Bodies in the Environment of the Law 
Alfred Siegfried, the coordinator of the Hilfswerk für Kinder der Landstrasse between 
1924 and 1958, laid out the objective of the program in terms which outlined the body 
as the key target for the prohibition of nomadic practices: “[o]ne has to say that some-
times the wood was simply too rotten and a lot is achieved when these people do not 
start a family, when they no longer continue to reproduce in an unrestrained manner, 
giving birth to future generations of depraved and abnormal children.”23 In her novel, 
Mehr articulates this depiction of reproduction as a dangerous inculcation of a heredi-
tary threat when she describes an interaction between the medical staff and one of the 
personalities she inhabits: 
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doctor anatv to silvia: “we know that you inherited the illness of your mother. you 
are young, we will be able to heal your hysteria.”they pretend to able to heal silvia 
with the great blackness, with the tubes and probes.they know nothing about sil-
via’s images during the coma,nothing about her mortal fear. they only want to be 
right, that is all (S, 145). 
Throughout the novel, the splitting of Mehr’s subject into multiple identities (Silvio, 
silvana, silvana…) mimics the perverse colonizing trauma inflicted upon her body. 
Mehr’s protagonist(s) are constantly being assessed, measured and categorized — “i 
have to strip naked, they give me a white shirt. They take my blood pressure. They 
measure my pulse” (S, 65). Mehr writes of the grotesque process of reproductive vul-
nerability within the text, when “with a loud, horrible cry i push something black, 
bloody out of myself, it is my own coffin” (S, 13). When Mehr writes of intrusive in-
stitutional practices on the body, the body is housed in an explicit structure, a static 
place in which suffering is authorized by the rigid boundaries of the space itself: “while 
blue cold saws my skull to pieces, deep inside the body a baby is smashed against steel 
walls. I hear the bones breaking” (S, 63).  
The state is structured within a juridical framework constructing static and yet uni-
versal sources of authority, in which each subject under the law must first be dismem-
bered before they can be disciplined through the process of inflicting sedentarization. 
The term “dismembered” is used deliberately here — in contrast to Piyel Haldar who 
describes this process as being “stripped down”24 — as a reflection of law’s need to 
sedentarize and sterilize the subject. Anupama Rao and Steven Pierce explore the use 
of corporeal discipline as a strategy “that undergirded the colonial and postcolonial 
state.”25 Acknowledging Michel Foucault’s reading of disciplinarity as an operation of 
incentivized power concentrated on the body through coercive control that maintained 
the effective boundaries of the state, it can be argued that a colonial form of corporeal 
control actually expands this process by negating the idea of complicity entirely: 
The rule of ‘colonial difference’ did not see natives as subjectified and thus open 
to enlightened socialization. Instead, colonialism relied upon the resignification 
of tradition and on corporeal regimes that reconfigured native bodies as legiti-
mately susceptible to the exercise of violence in the interests of good governance. 
Bounded on one side by native exoticism and on the other by the brute facticity 
of native suffering, the modalities of control that emerged from this compromise 
were unable to displace the constitutive relation of law and violence through the 
myth of temporal distance available in the metropole.26 
The attempt to define an ethnic minority as a condition of degeneracy creates a juridical 
framework in which the law becomes both the tool and the procedure with which to 
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“heal [the] hysteria” of ‘illegitimate’ genealogy. In this way, the law’s role in repro-
ducing and authorizing systems of corporeal disciplinarity can be regarded as a mainte-
nance of the borders of the sovereign state. This cauterization of hereditary ‘disease’ 
(as ‘Other than the state’) is also, however, revealed as colonization by law’s paradox-
ical claim to be “everywhere, steeped in things, bodies, distances.”27 In this way, as 
Margrit Shildrick writes, “[t]he principal organising binary is no longer legal and ille-
gal, but normal and abnormal”.28 In this context, law is no longer operating as a regu-
latory mechanism, but is implicated in the reproduction and repression of categories of 
rupture. In this way, “the subject no longer stands before the law awaiting judgement, 
but is constituted by the subject effects of its capillary circulation.”29 The body of the 
nomad is not considered in terms of the excluded subject but must be characterized as 
Foucault’s “monster,” abnormal and ultimately transgressive, to obscure the vulnera-
bility of the self-authorizing mutual foundation of the law and the state.30 Here, the law 
is powerful and intrusive, yet simultaneously represents a spectacle of absence, which 
can only “pretend to heal […] with tubes and probes” using “the great blackness.” De-
spite its aesthetics of omniscience, the law is revealed as a broken site of inference, in 
which the dialogic nature of power can be glimpsed from within ruptures: “from the 
sandstone walls of the houses crumbles the stateliness of false righteousness, crumbles 
traditional perfection, efficaciously administered provinciality” (S, 3). This rupture in 
juridical power can be further observed through the way in which Mehr plays with 
syntax: when her protagonist is trapped in “incomprehension, emptiness, airless room, 
white, much white, tiles” (S, 70), the repetition of “white” can be seen to both enforce 
a sense of sterility while at the same time inserting an abrupt interruption in the seman-
tic drive to insist upon “emptiness” and the blank space of the environment.  
As Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos has identified, it is indeed this excavation 
of the spatiality implicated in the process of juridically enforced genocide that reveals 
the paradox in law’s claim to be universal: 
environment for the law is not just external to law but significantly law’s exter-
nalization, that is law’s graveyard of otherness. Environment for the law is the 
locus of law’s haunted, repressed memory, as well as its various becomings that 
the law often disavows.31 
Here, the “graveyard of otherness” suggests that any attempt to use the law to enact an 
anti-genealogical procedure at the site of the Othered body will always be held hostage 
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by its own temporal state of being, revealing “the undecidability of all forms of em-
bodiment.“32 Mehr engages with the spatializing of memory in similar terms when she 
describes how the corporeal, rendered here as inviolably present through a first-person 
narrative, is contained within a temporal vacuum, “the first five years i remained mute, 
trapped within the dull lack of contact.autism: to face the world and respond with si-
lence to her message” (S, 7). Of the use of “silence” as a response to the normative 
emphasizes the ways in which law’s gestures at confinement reveal its own temporal 
limits. If the vulnerable subject is rendered abject through a process of rupture, this 
only serves to expose the way in which “law is so steeped in matter and moving so 
closely to it that it ends up being without limits and, most importantly, without limita-
tions.”33 To read this as omniscience, however, is to ignore the possibilities in which 
vulnerable disembodiment can turn towards silence, revealing the “blackness” of the 
juridical gaze in which all are embedded—transgression here is the common element 
in the juridical authorization of corporeal normativity, not the anomaly. The depth of 
this gaze echoes Agamben’s reflections on the figure of the Muselmann (after Primo 
Levi), the one who cannot speak, located at the zone of indistinction between the human 
and the inhuman as a witness to this indistinction as it is marked by the law.34 The 
ethical aporia of witnessing identified by Agamben reveals an ethics of bare life, the 
witness who cannot testify to the violence of the law, just as Mehr’s subjects remain 
“trapped” in their “silence.” Law’s reliance on the Othered body lying before it on the 
slab is therefore immediately revealed as a potential strategy for the unraveling of the 
law, by means of taking account of that which is often relegated to the margins in legal 
theory: “the fact of human material embodiment, on which law ultimately relies for its 
effect.”35  
Nowhere is this reliance on ‘human material embodiment’ more evident than in the 
prohibitions against ethnic minorities such as the Yenish, historically reviled due to 
their nomadic existence. The practice of nomadism has resulted in a proliferation of 
laws that are “unique,” as “whilst most crimes are defined by actions, vagrancy laws 
make no specific action or inaction illegal. Rather the laws are based on personal con-
dition, state of being, and social and economic status.”36 These punitive measures used 
as an “overarching mechanism to control and punish a selective group of people” are, 
therefore, centered on a particular ontological reading of the body.37 In this context, 
reading the environment of the law as “actualised materiality”38 exposes the way in 
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which law must obscure while it defiles: although it can never be static, it acts to punish 
bodies which explicitly reveal its ongoing practices of becoming in which “the law 
evolves, changes, innovates, grapples with new concepts, crashes, fails, is co-opted, is 
abused.”39 Normativity is thus born out of a fear of reproduction in which the threat to 
the nation is constantly reborn through the figure of the nomad, and a denial of Other 
bodies for whom the darkness at the limit is rendered material at the point of disem-
bodiment. Authorizing the law is achieved through this process of disavowal, whereby 
the normative deliberately “places bodies on the line,” in which the torture of the ab-
normal is revealed as “an extreme and repulsive form of the organized violence of in-
stitutions,” as “the interpretive commitments of a community which resists official law 
must […] be realized in the flesh.”40 The law is revealed as a problematically incom-
plete body: although it “defines which bodies are to be brought in affective contact with 
the law […] [a]t the same time, law is affected by these bodies and connections,” em-
phasizing its foundational conceit in which all the contours of the abnormal are laid 
bare before the law.41  
3_Spatializing the Outlaw and the Illegitimate Children of the Road 
Mehr portrays the institutions of the state as omniscient figures bearing down on the 
narrators — “the god of my childhood wears black robes, horns on the head and an ax 
on the hand” — and yet confirms simultaneously that it is possible for them, even in 
an abject state of vulnerability, to re-embody this quasi-mythical beast in order to 
“squeeze past him?” (S 83) Throughout the novel, Mehr subverts the narrative of op-
pressive power in which the nation-state is delineated through its juridical construction 
of the vulnerable body. It is worth drawing here on Martha Fineman’s work on the 
concept of vulnerability as a “heuristic device” through which to read the law’s role in 
the production of the vulnerable subject. Her approach redirects the focus from the 
body of the vulnerable subject onto the “fragile materiality” of the normative and its 
role in producing, shaping and condemning that very vulnerability.42 Thus, as Anna 
Grear writes, “the disembodying closures of the liberal juridical order focally include 
a highly selective, complexly incomplete (and ultimately impossible) excision both of 
bodies and of socio material context.”43 For Grear, this process of disembodiment — 
in which the state is enabled through the law to rid itself of its corporeal origination 
and material gestation through the excision of the ‘disease’ of the nomadic minority — 
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gestures towards “the production of a mythic, ‘even’ juridical surface upon which law’s 
equally mythic actors (autonomous, de-contextualised, (quasi-) disembodied) […] 
glide upon a grid of linear, smooth, mutual and neutral interactions.”44 
It has been argued that “the construction of the Swiss nation was at least partly 
founded on what could be described as the Swiss ‘dream of order’ as the social and 
political order was seen to be ‘troubled’ by various categories of ‘unorderly’ (‘unor-
dentlich’) citizens and non-citizens.”45 In 1927, Swiss Federal Councilor Heinrich 
Haberlin confirmed that a key aim for Pro Juventute was to dismantle “vagrant families 
whose members are without discipline and erratically indulge in nomadism […] creat-
ing a dark stain on our Swiss homeland’s proud cultural order.”46 In this context, the 
positioning of nomads as a “dark stain” creates a discursive narrative of disease and 
degeneration in which exclusion and institutionalization is medicalized as curative for 
the sedentary ‘body’ of the nation-state.47 As Véronique Mottier argues, “[t]he history 
of Swiss eugenics is intertwined with the constitution of the modern Swiss state […]. 
Consequently, the Swiss efforts to construct a eugenic social order have been histori-
cally conflated with the construction of the national order.”48 The integration of the 
‘degenerate’ nomadic minority into the legal topography of the state as a source of 
disorder provided the opportunity for the application of eugenic practices “through a 
complex and interacting set of institutions and a dispersed set of mechanisms.”49 These 
mechanisms of enforcing sedentarization, as the administration of ‘order’ cauterizing 
diseased elements of the body of the nation-state, involved a wide variety of medical 
procedures labeled as “ ‘curative’ medical treatments for their ‘genetic deformity’, such 
as frequent EST, insulin therapy and compulsory sterilization.”50  
Mehr portrays this inherited condition of disorder, degeneracy and disability as a 
metaphysical weight, as the narrator describes how she has “carried around this respon-
sibility with me, later in the detention halls, in the institutes, in prison” (S, 10). Her 
physical movement through such heavily regulated institutional spaces existing as mi-
crocosmic topographies of the disciplinary nation-state demonstrates that “law’s spati-
ality cannot be understood in isolation from its corporeality.”51 The subject of this auto-
fiction, in her tendency to split into multiple identities, has become Foucault’s “mon-
ster”: as her existence is both “impossible and forbidden,” her movement through these 
ordered spaces accidentally serves to reveal “the limit [and] the point at which law is 
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overturned.”52 In the narrative of the degenerative body of the nomad acting as a dis-
eased part of the corporeal nation-state, the way in which abject exclusion is rendered 
as vulnerable excess (‘you do not belong’) is revealed as fundamentally problematic, 
as it is revealed as fundamentally constitutive to the birthing of the nation-state itself. 
Thus, juridical corporeality ruptures itself everywhere, exposing the spatializing of dis-
order as eternal unraveling: “there, where silvia IS NOT, an uncanny laughter empties 
silvana of life: madness” (S, 135). The figure of the abnormal thus transcends both the 
cosmological limits (in which the nomadic is produced from a time before the nation-
state) and also occupies a site at the ethics of the biopolitical, at which point disobedi-
ence is encountered by the retreat into dehumanization. Silvia and Silvana are both 
reduced to a disembodied yet spatially resistant presence, a reflection of the Muselmann 
who reaches “a state of physical inaction and psychological desperation resembling 
autism.”53 This “liminal state,” however, is capable of doing damage to the normative 
order as it reveals the manufacture of submission at the very point at which this quasi-
disembodied subject “ceased to maintain a relation to the world beyond the camS”54  
Within the text, Mehr constructs an environment saturated with fertile corporeality, 
a viscerally sensory “landscape” in which “red poison blossoms on the side of the road, 
fists, silviasilviosilvana, and the thundering heartbeat of an alien power” (S, 25). The 
law, in this context, births its own abnormality: the forceful presence of an “alien 
power” signifies the sovereign authority that shapes the space attempting to hold the 
Othered body. As Foucault writes, “[t]he notion of the monster is essentially a legal 
notion […] since what designates the monster is the fact that its existence and form is 
not only a violation of the laws of society but also a violation of the laws of nature. Its 
very existence is a breach of the law at both levels.”55 Whilst the protagonists perform 
as an assemblage “silviasilviosilvana,” they are subject to the liminal spaces of the re-
productive cycle, where they are always in wait, in limbo, recognizing that “this is not 
your home, little one, you know it, you know about the pitiless silence, about the maw 
lying in wait, about the horror. silviasilviosilvana cannot flee” (S, 25). However, when 
the protagonists disassemble (or are dissected) into distinct identities, they become 
mortally confined and yet capable of spatial resistance which is not about bearing wit-
ness to their suffering (which is an impossibility) but rather, by revealing the inherent 
vulnerability of normative positioning: “they pull silvia into a padded room, they tie 
her into white, icecold sheets, let her lie there, endlessly long . . . silvia moves herself 
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to the side, feels nothing anymore” (S, 144). Although silvia is trapped in temporally 
static claustrophobic space, the fact that she can assume a certain immunity to pain and 
position herself in an elsewhere suggests that the borders of the site of incarceration 
have a porosity rendered visible through containment. The clash of the nomadic — 
rendered bare life here — with the settled represents the failed attempt to position the 
nomadic as “legally non-existent” by virtue of their abject excision from the spatial 
imaginary.56 The possibility of movement of any kind, even if reduced to the act of 
corporeal disassociation, reveals that the “world […] is uneven.”57 In this way, Mehr 
subverts the framing of vulnerability by playing with the boundaries of subjective cor-
poreality:  
who am i?where do i begin to be,where do i end?[…]i did not want this body, 
damned, so take it back or give it a chance, to be I. silvia feels an arm, the one that 
they call the right arm, sometimes a leg, a head.perhaps silvia herself is a mon-
strosity, with many arms, legs, and heads. (S, 116) 
The “embeddedness” of the vulnerable subject within the “messy, contextual, concrete, 
fleshy imperatives, potentialities and limitations of a fully embodied, particular and 
collective life” demonstrates that even in the process of excising the deviant corporeal, 
the productive force of the law is always implicated (and, simultaneously, disavowed) 
in the birthing of abnormal bodies.58  
In this way, “monstrosity” is exposed as an adverse site of determinant reproduction, 
in which the deviant growth exposes the limit point of the law: “where do i begin to be, 
where do I end?” If the modern state relies on juridical foundations of sovereign gesta-
tion — as “[i]t is through reproductive sexuality that the nation is biologically re-
placed”59 — the presence of the voiceless dismembered Other tests the ethics of nor-
mative production. This dismemberment is not disembodiment, but an attempt to ne-
gate the emergence of a revelation of the vulnerable link between the corporeal and the 
material teleology of the state.60 In her monstrosity, silvia becomes a transgression of 
the juridical, a “natural irregularity that calls law into question and disables it. The law 
must either question its own foundations, or its practice, or fall silent.”61 This practice 
of reproduction which seeks to obscure its own degenerative materiality can be theo-
rized effectively through Deleuze and Guattari’s work on the BwO. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, this concept reflects a state of spatial liminality in which “[y]ou never reach 
the Body without Organs, you can’t reach it, you are forever attaining it, it is a limit.”62 
This containment of dangerous bodies as analogous to the purification of the nation-
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state reveals the contingency of the material, in which “a body’s movement is always 
contextualised by the space on which it moves.”63  
In Mehr’s text, material is evoked through an orchestra of sounds which actively 
infiltrate her body, as the environment she is in shifts and moves constantly — “laugh-
ter,the echo eats into the pores, incapacities the spaces inside.hold on to whatever is 
immovable,silvana, perhaps to the walls and sidewalks” (S, 39). Here, the narrator’s 
dismembered body contains both the Muselmann, at the end of suffering, and absorbs 
the porous vulnerability of the space itself. The constitution of a mutually-infiltrating 
environment containing law, and law’s diseased Others, emphasizes the composition 
of all bodies as fluid, porous and dynamic; that which can neither be confined nor de-
fined as place, scene or receptacle — which is always “occupied, populated only by 
intensities.”64 Here, the materiality of disembodiment is reproduced through a hyper-
active presence in which: 
The BwO causes intensities to pass; it produces and distributes them in a spatium 
that is itself intensive, lacking extension. It is not space, nor is it in space; it is 
matter that occupies space to a given degree — to the degree corresponding to the 
intensities produced. It is nonstratified, unformed, intense matter, the matrix of 
intensity.65 
For Deleuze and Guattari, this ontology of the corporeal is implicated in a collision of 
space, an occupation of the dynamic dialectic at which chaos emerges, and yet is more 
than simply an embodiment of the material resulting from this interaction.66 Hence, 
law’s attempt to eradicate its own degenerative impulses leaves its own body in a dis-
assembling locus of being before itself: as one iteration of Mehr’s multiple narrating 
figures describes, she is positioned “between day and night, there is nomansland.there, 
three moons blossom.there the toads squat with multifaceted eyes, twilight, and knife” 
(S, 21). If this “nomansland” is interpreted as a spatio-temporal matrix, a “continuum 
of all substances in intensity and of all intensities in substance,”67 then the corporeality 
spatialized in “this between-world” (S, 123) must be read through the materiality that 
the law perpetually seeks to negate, where “matter is seen as radically anterior.”68 It is 
here, in the body’s negotiation with space,69 that juridical authority can be seen to come 
undone. The nonlinear dislocating narrative of this work of auto-fiction provides a pro-
ductive of engaging with the ‘undoing’ of law by questioning law’s production of the 
vulnerable body, and exposing the inherent vulnerability of the sedentary spatial order 
from which the threatening body of the nomad must be juridically excised. Mehr’s 
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work subverts the mode of suffering experienced through the corporeal dismember-
ment of the dehumanized figure by revealing the way in which the normative produc-
tion of the abnormal, dangerous, and monstrous relies on this excision to obscure its 
own mythical role birthing the vulnerable state.  
4_Splitting the Body, Assemblages, Waste, and Withdrawal  
Although the law maintains its authority through its anticipation of the relationality 
between space and the corporeal,70 its efficacy as a system of containment is generated 
primarily through the sadistic sculpting of vulnerability. Indeed, in the text, Mehr de-
scribes the way in which her narrator’s “legal guardianship continued to prune” (S, 4). 
And yet, while this seemingly portrays the absolute authority of the law to wield its 
power over an abject subject, the paradox of this process of subjectification is that, as 
Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos suggests, “[a] body withdrawing is law with-
drawing.”71 For Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, this process is therefore marked by an 
irrevocably incommensurate gesture towards absence, in which “withdrawal is materi-
ally embodied and emplaced. It is always here, in the space opened up by the law.”72 
In this sense, withdrawal can be read as a strategy of resistance as well as the manifes-
tation of law’s fallibility, which can also be considered in the light of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s reading of the BwO as fundamentally in opposition to withdrawal or, as they 
define it, “disarticulation.”73 The law is always embedded in the ongoing negation of 
embodiment, negating the “mundane fact that for law to function at all, it must first and 
foremost have a hold over bodies.”74 
Mehr frequently acknowledges this in the text when the anonymous representatives 
of the normative order “torment” her narrator through a ritual of punishment (S, 65). 
Like Agamben’s Muselmann, the narrating subject is tortured to a point beyond feeling. 
However, when Mehr’s protagonist is reduced to “a shapeless mass of flesh” respond-
ing to the quasi-disembodiment of a corporeal construct of the juridical order which is, 
to quote Anna Grear, itself “hardly human after all”75 — “two faces bend over the white 
bed.two pairs of eyes glint black and threatening” (S, 8) — she remains a threat to the 
sculpting process of the law, even while “being punished” for her immobility (S, 8). 
The vulnerable subject therefore paradoxically remains a threat on the basis of her iden-
tity as a nomad, and yet is being disciplined for remaining still, with what is left of her 
body. The narrating figure experiences her monstrosity through a form of distancing, 
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rather than dissimulation, in which the abject figure withdraws to a position beyond 
witnessing.76 From this perspective, it is apparent that the law relies on the negated 
disembodiment of the degenerative body: to enable withdrawal of any kind would be 
to “[move] one’s body away from the law, withdraws one’s corporeal attachment to it 
and [see] the law in full materiality.”77  
Mehr’s emergent first-person narrator articulates the visceral reality of organs are 
emphasized through the use of a symbolic metaphor juxtaposing mortality with sex — 
“on the altar beats a black rotting heart.red satin falls into soft folds” (S, 28). The sen-
sory texture of the “red satin [falling] into soft folds,” mimicking a feminized sexual 
organ, creates a jarring contrast with the harsh consonants of the “black rotting heart” 
laid sacrificially on the altar. The sibilance of the cascading, bright material unfurls 
before the reader, highlighting a form of materiality that does not rely on the law for its 
corporeal seductiveness. Indeed, in writing this juxtaposition into the text Mehr reveals 
a gentle lasciviousness to the dissection of body parts which contradicts the sharp edges 
and spaces of the wards within which she is incarcerated. Mehr repeats this pattern 
when describing the vast, fleshy growth of memory that “grows like an ulcer in the 
belly, […] reaching about with gelatinous tentacles, consuming, devouring all from the 
inside out” (S, 29). Similarly, this birthing of memory as identity reveals a form of 
resistance that remains past dismemberment in a totally new form of corporeal materi-
ality. Just as the sumptuous suggestiveness of the folds of red satin subdue the sacrifi-
cial lament to the vulnerable subject, the “paralyzing” growth of this ulcer exudes a 
complex resilience which echoes Grear’s characterization of vulnerability as “a poten-
tially transformative embodied politics” in which the body is always woven into “rup-
tures” in the material of the normative social order.78 In one particularly disturbing 
scene, when the narrator has become trapped in the body of another personality 
(Bruno), imitating a form of rupture and repair that exists in the realm beyond mimicry: 
i stand in front of the mirror in bruno’s belly.but there is a strange boy-face, tiny, 
defiant, small.the boy-face turns into a cruel japense mask.i feel I am not here.the 
objects loose their significance, doors, restroom, bathtub,they all seem to exist 
detached from their functions.fear.i cry, hear myself cry,want to get out.but what 
is outside is still more horrible, there silviasilviosilvana looses her bearings abso-
lutely. (S, 11) 
In this instance, the matrix of intensities suspends all objects in a grotesque perfor-
mance of becoming-Other, in which the multiple identities conceived through rupture 
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are confined without direction, fearing an ‘outside’ in which their Other self is contin-
uously implicated without an end in sight. Here the rupture in matter cannot be resolved 
by a juridical emphasis on dismemberment, as Mehr’s portrayal of spatiality empha-
sizes that her narrator’s skin exists as an intrusive epidermis which has the capacity to 
act as a palimpsestic marker of the narrator’s own presence — “roomwalls that impress 
themselves on the skin like alien, dangerous runes” (S, 33). The body which remains 
exists only as a cartography, sadistically bearing silent witness to her nomadic identity: 
“scars cover leather-red skin, create roads, furrows, gorges, which my awareness does 
not dare to explore” (S, 48). Similarly, “the scars [which] grow rampant in me” (S, 48) 
replicate the sacrificial lament to the body of the vulnerable subject, the “rotting heart” 
emerging from within, a BwO which retreats into itself through an ethics of temporal 
collapse, a disobedience of “comparative densities and intensities.”79 
Mehr’s subversion to the lament of the vulnerable subject as a necessary sacrifice 
for the good of the sedentary spatial order can be glimpsed through her use of rich, 
sensory language, and metaphors that both dismember and highlight the corporeal, but 
on her own terms: she writes that, “in our language, the heart is a thing: it, the heart, 
the yenish people don’t have a word for heart at all.they call it ‘soori’ just as they say 
‘soori’ for love, god, and the penis” (S, 16). In this way, the naming of parts is another 
way in which colonization of spatiality takes place through the corporeal, paradoxically 
objectifying whilst reaffirming how one must simultaneously “make a thing of the 
heart, this powerexuding lump of flesh, to cutify this primal machine” (S, 16). Drawing 
on the phenomenological analysis of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Sarah Keenan argues 
that the spatial recognition of the body is complicit both in the production of space and 
in its actualization.80 She suggests that, therefore, the body can never be exorcised from 
spatiality nor can space exclude itself from the rupture of becoming as “the body […] 
takes space with it, and is necessarily more than a closed, complete physical entity.”81  
The medicalization of the narrator’s body can be read as an attempt of the juridical 
to excoriate its own rupture: if “silvana belongs neither here nor there” (S, 61) her cor-
poreality is also never absent from the scene. Although Mehr emphasizes the narrator’s 
desire for “the finality of this destruction” (S, 62), the desire which produces the BwO 
as part of a normative experimentation with the laceration of its own disorder is never 
about reaching death: the BwO is not suicidal.82 In this way, the body of the narrator is 
neither incapacitated nor disassembled through the drive to assign order, as she is never 
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“simply surrounded by space or even embedded in space, but rather they are themselves 
a part of space as space is a part of them.”83 In this way, taking the body’s organs as 
borders marking the ongoing articulation of rupture and repair must always 
acknowledge that “[s]pace does not end where the skin of the subject ends.”84 Conse-
quently, in Keenan’s critique of Merleau-Ponty, she observes that his neglect of the 
particular process by which the corporeality of the subject is situated also fails to rec-
ognize the potential power in those whose bodies are held hostage, as their spatial cor-
poreality can be neither imposed nor static.85  
In the context of law’s BwO, passivity is never possible even when the body is held 
in suspension, as its intensity ensures that “the BwO is always swinging between the 
surfaces that stratify it and the plane that sets it free.”86 It could also be argued that even 
Agamben’s dehumanized Muselmann offers the opportunity to redraw an ethics of hu-
manity, as even this figure of bare life is never non-human.87 Taking account of the 
juridical encounter with pathology must then identify the spatiality that emerges 
through this process as both site and assemblage.88 The narrator’s deterioration there-
fore reflects both the attempt to shed the limits of vulnerability and the endless becom-
ing which births itself from that ruptured site of emergence: “inwardly words are rot-
ting.the pain tears itself apart on barbed wire.a beating heart begins to fill the lightless 
mouth” (S, 14). Here, even whilst organs are being cut away — “they flake off smooth 
skin like bad quality whitewash” (S, 118) — the body is immersed in the nomos as a 
reminder of its originary claim to shape all space. When Mehr’s narrator exclaims “de-
tritus,i am detritus, detritus of myself,without any utility” (S, 118) this repetition of 
‘detritus’ is not, therefore, an indication of diseased substance posing as a destructive 
identity but the recognition of law’s impulse to contain “the outer edge of legality.”89 
5_Healing Nomadic Bodies through the Law? 
The concept of vulnerability and its relationship to bioethics and legality has been ex-
tensively studied,90 most notably in the vast feminist research on vulnerability as it is 
framed through concepts of resilience, responsibility and universalism.91 In this article, 
I have focused on the concept of vulnerability in an attempt to navigate the normative 
positing of the ‘degenerate,’ nomadic body while remaining aware of the risk this im-
plies of “fetishizing the body as the lost object.”92 The scene of the nomos as a direc-
tionless becoming incarcerates this body as a BwO to obscure the originary dimensions 
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of the mutual authorization of law and the state.93 As a consequence, the juridical drive 
to sedentarize monstrosity must find a means of regulating the BwO without either 
indicating the vulnerability of production of the national spatial imaginary and the 
emergence of the normative “within the messy, contextual [and the] fleshy.”94 Ac-
knowledging that vulnerability comes from the Latin vulnus (wound),95 Mehr’s text 
can be read as a subversive exposure of the vulnerability of the “mythic origin of both 
state and citizen,”96 the normative production of abnormal corporeality. Mehr’s exper-
imentation with the theme of reproduction as fatal bereavement — “with a loud, horri-
ble cry i push something black, bloody out of myself.it is my own coffin” (S, 13) — 
acts as more than a literary refraction of the Hilfswerk für Kinder der Landstrasse’s 
stated objective to rupture the inherited condition of ‘degeneracy’ as disease and disor-
der. It also reflects the way in which the articulation of corporeality is explicitly femi-
nized.97 Mehr’s text depicts the disrupted rhizomatic identity which connects the nar-
rator to her own mother, her baby, and the birthing of several identities in trauma: 
the message of death penetrates the skin, nestles deep inside, there, where the heart 
is, fear, fear, fear.mummy pulls at the umbilical cord.silvia’s body arches beneath 
this brutal pain along the sides of the belly.sticky cord around the neck,air, air, 
air.the umbilical cord, symbol of the unborn life, connection,bridge between her 
and silvia,it becomes a deadly weapon here,life itself seems to turn against silvia. 
(S, 125) 
The ‘turning’ and unfolding of life in the cataclysm of a birth process characterized by 
peristaltic motion, symbolized through Mehr’s use of short sentences and repetition, 
reflects the connection between reproduction and suffering as a normative denial of 
law’s limit. The emphasis on “unborn life” as a “deadly weapon” not only reflects the 
sedentarizing program inflicted on the Yenish but also emphasizes the use of vulnera-
bility as a concept which highlights the body’s capacity for trauma.98  
Vulnerability, in this context, is a relational interaction with the vulnerable state, in 
which the body’s ontology as a porous border can be breached but continuously leaves 
behind a sense of “pinkvulnerability” (S, 122) wherein corporeality is brought threat-
eningly out into the open.99 However, Mehr’s systematic dismantling of syntax and the 
fluid shift between identities and narrative perspectives constructs a sense in which 
corporeality is never absent from the production of its own suffering: the narrator is 
“bedded in the uselessness of many lost years, experiences, bedded in a mass of body 
that splits itself into a thousand pieces” (S, 122). Here, although the body is splintered 
On_Culture: The Open Journal for the Study of Culture 
Issue 3 (2017): Law Undone 
www.on-culture.org 
http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2017/12998/ 
19 
and ruptured it is also explicitly grounded in space. Hence, when Mehr writes that 
“skinless, without protection, they float into the gutter of the night” (S, 122), the narra-
tors are tethered to the cycle of rupture and repair that underpins the juridical, in which 
embodiment operates through normative space. In this way, Mehr’s text reveals the 
way that the juridical relies on vulnerability to obscure its own corporeal vulnerabil-
ity.100  
Using vulnerability theory to reaffirm the patriarchal impulse of the law to specify 
its disembodiment serves, then, to demonstrate the necessity of the juridical to spawn 
a BwO that can obscure its grotesque spatial and temporal intensities.101 Hence, where 
it can be said that the “BwO howls: ‘They’ve made me an organism! They’ve wrong-
fully folded me! They’ve stolen my body!’ ”102 This emphasizes the normative phe-
nomenon of incorporating the shedding of organs to hide the necessary and ongoing 
process of spacing the law. When Mehr writes that “they shred my body, they torment 
me” (S, 65), it is not then torture that precedes the murder of her narrator or the death 
of the narrative but rather the ongoing accumulation of intensity, whereby “to be ripped 
apart at the middle of the body” (S, 65) is to “fall into a black nothing”: becoming 
before after and through the law (S, 70). 
In this way, Mehr’s novel can be interpreted as a portrayal of the “grandiose spec-
tacle” of “the rotting stench of my dying self” (S, 30) which is not a lament to the 
dismembered and disembodied vulnerable subject but a powerful excavation of the way 
in which law relies on “the excision of embodiment” in order to obscure the ongoing 
production of a “linear, smooth […] sense of orderly closure.”103 In this way, undoing 
the law is revealed as a process of acknowledging the disruptive potential of bare life 
and its role in the exposure of the vulnerability of the modern state. My engaging with 
this work of auto-fiction has aimed to acknowledge the corporeality of the monstrous, 
and the subject who has been excessively dehumanized to preserve the authority of the 
sedentary social order, in order to reveal that law’s role in perpetuating this dismem-
berment merely offers us a glimpse of its undoing. As Margrit Shildrick observes, the 
acknowledgment of transgressive bodies coming before the law has always been a sig-
nificant topic of discussion, due to its subsequent critique of "the stability and authority 
of law" rather than “for the betterment of those with radically anomalous embodi-
ment.”104 Reading through the text’s engagement with the rhetoric of abnormality and 
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the threat of the monstrous nomad creates a means of envisaging the potential for ar-
ticulating the embodiment of vulnerability as justice.105 Returning to the abhorrent his-
tory of the Swiss state’s attempt to eradicate the Yenish community offers an oppor-
tunity to expose law’s role in the deliberate production of degenerate bodies, and es-
tablishes a necessary critique of the contemporary production of vulnerable subjects as 
part of the insidious juridical narrative of the state. 
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